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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
JOSEPH E. SHEEHYt
Text of remarks presented by Mr. Sheehy to the Round Table on Trade
Regulation at the 1959 annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, held at St. Louis, Missouri, December 29, 1959.
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you a few of the
developments in recent Robinson-Patman Act cases which I consider
significant. My comments, of course, are expressions of my personal
views and I am not speaking for, or necessarily expressing the views
of, the Federal Trade Commission.
The matter of area price discrimination is one which is receiving
increasing attention and one on which there is relatively little case
law. This despite the fact it unquestionably was one of the major
targets of Congress at the time of the passage of both the original
Clayton Act' and the Robinson-Patman Amendment.2 This practice
of lowering prices in one geographic area while maintaining or en-
hancing them elsewhere enables large companies with interstate
treasuries to subsidize local price cutting without material impair-
ment of their over-all profits.
Federal Trade Commission v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.3 is a case of
more than usual interest in this field. It is now pending in the
Supreme Court, certiorari having been granted in November 1959.4
Anheuser-Busch lowered the price of its Budweiser Beer in St. Louis
and the surrounding St. Louis County area while maintaining its
prices in all other sales areas throughout the United States. Its prices
were not identical in all areas, but in each it maintained a differential
for its "premium" product over the price being charged there for
regional or local beers. In the St. Louis territory, however, it adopted
a price reduction program which eventually wiped out the differential
and placed the premium Budweiser on exactly the same price level as
the local beers. The record shows that during the period of the price
reduction there was an over-all increase in beer sales in the affected
' Director, Bureau of Litigation, Federal Trade Commission.
1. § 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
2. § 592,49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
3. 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959).
4. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 361
U.S. 880 (1959).
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market of less than ten percent, but that Anheuser-Busch increased
its sales by more than two hundred percent. Of its three principal
local competitors, one suffered a slight loss while the other two suf-
fered crippling sales losses. Since this was a section 2(a)5 case, re-
spondent had available all of the statutory defenses, including the
good faith meeting of a competitor's equally low price,6 which defense
was vigorously asserted.
The hearing examiner, however, having found the existence of ad-
verse competitive effect, concluded that "the good faith requirement
of section 2 (b) of the Clayton Act is not met where the price dis-
crimination, with the required resultant competitive effect, is for
aggressive rather than defensive purposes. ' 7
The Commission adopted, with some modification, the order of the
hearing examiner.' The court of appeals, however, found that the
Commission had failed to establish a price discrimination in violation
of section 2 (a).9 This decision of the court seems to be based on the
fact that the seller's customers in the St. Louis market who received
the lower price were not in competition with its customers in other
markets who paid the higher price. It ignores both the statutory
language and prior judicial construction of the section. Clearly the
law is aimed at injury in either the primary or secondary lines of
competition. The decision of the court of appeals limits the area of
measurement to the secondary line.
The matter is now pending in the Supreme Court on one simple
question which, as stated in the petition for certiorari, is:
Whether price cutting in a particular locality by a nationwide
seller who maintains higher prices in other localities, with con-
5. Robinson-Patman Act § 2 (a) states:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimina-
tion are in commerce, . . . and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
6. Robinson-Patman Act 2(b) states:
That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima
facie case . . . by showing that his lower price . . . to any purchaser or
purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor ....
7. Initial decision by Hearing Examiner Frank Hier, October 25, 1956. Trade
Reg. Rep. 26,257 (1956).
8. Trade Reg. Rep. 26,705 (1957).
9. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677, 681-82 (7th Cir. 1959).
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sequent injury to competition in the locality in which the lower
price is charged, constitutes a discrimination in price forbidden
by section 2 (a) of the amended Clayton Act?
And now a few questions growing out of this case:
1. Does the Commission's decision require a national distributor to
maintain a single price throughout the entire country?
No. The Commission recognized that Anheuser-Busch had different
prices in various geographic areas, but its attack was limited to those
price differences which it had reason to believe affected competition
adversely. And, of course, varying prices in different areas are per-
fectly lawful when they simply reflect cost differences.
2. Is evidence of predatory intent essential in an area price dis-
crimination case?
No. But from my experience I am of the opinion that it will be
present in practically every instance and we, of course, shall put in
the available evidence on this point. It is of special importance in
establishing that the lower price was not made in "good faith" to
meet the equally low price of a competitor.
Let us turn now to section 2 (d)10 dealing with the failure to pro-
portionalize the payment for services or facilties furnished by a re-
seller. In the Federal Trade Commission proceedings against P.
Lorillard Company and General Foods Corporation," the facts as
stipulated showed that major broadcasting companies, in promoting
the sale of radio and television time, entered into separate contracts
with certain grocery chains. The broadcasting companies agreed to
furnish broadcasting time to the chains, and the chains agreed to
conduct week-long promotional displays on products sold in their
stores, such products to be selected by the broadcasting companies.
These contracts were initiated by the broadcasting companies, and
were made without any prior commitment or agreement involving
anyone other than the grocery chains and the broadcasting com-
panies. Following negotiation of this series of contracts, the broad-
casting companies solicited P. Lorillard Company and General Foods
Corporation to purchase radio or television time from them for the
10. Robinson-Patman Act § 2 (d) states:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or
contract for the payment of any thing of value to or for the benefit of a
customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation
or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through
such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offer-
ing for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered
for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available
on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the dis-
tribution of such products or commodities.
11. P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1959).
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advertising of the products of Lorillard and General Foods. As an
added inducement for such purchase, the broadcasting companies
offered in-store promotions of Lorillard and General Food products in
certain chain stores under contract with the broadcasting companies.
Lorillard and General Foods entered into contracts with the broad-
casting companies which contained no mention of the in-store pro-
motions or of the broadcasting time which would be furnished to the
chains, and provided for the purchase of radio or television time
at the regular card rate which they would have had to pay whether
or not they received any in-store promotion. In soliciting purchasers
of radio and television time, the broadcasting companies furnished
them with brochures and circulars pointing up the benefits of the
in-store promotions which were available to them if they would buy
minimum quantities of broadcasting time at the regular card rate.
The hearing examiner found that the payments by Lorillard and
General Foods to the broadcasting companies were for the benefit of
the participating chain store customers in consideration for in-store
promotional facilities furnished by them. Furthermore, since these
or similar benefits were not made available on proportionally equal
terms to Lorillard's and General Foods' other customers who com-
peted with the favored customers in the distribution of respondents'
products, there was a violation of section 2 (d) .12
On review in the court of appeals, Lorillard and General Foods each
denied that it had paid anything to or contracted with the broad-
casting companies "for the benefit of" a customer within the meaning
of section 2 (d) of the Clayton Act. Each further denied having paid
for or supported the furnishing of broadcasting time to the chains,
and, lastly, denied having adopted, or having become a party to, the
broadcasting companies' sales promotions. The court stated that the
real question involved was whether Lorillard or General Foods had
made payments to someone which actually were of benefit to their
customers and not whether they had bound themselves to do so by a
legally enforceable contract.-, In its opinion of June 1959, the Third
Circuit made it clear that
"The purpose of the section here involved was to eliminate all
discriminations under the guise of payments for advertising or
promotional services, and Congress employed language that
would cover any evasive methods .... 11
It rejected the petitioners' argument that the facts must be considered
in the light of technical rules of contract law, and agreed with the
12. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(d), note 10 supra.
13. 267 F.2d at 443-45.
14. Id. at 443
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Commission that the enforcement agency may view the contracts as
a whole. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.-
And now a few questions suggested by these cases.
1. When the payment for the benefit of a customer is in a form
which advertises only the private brand products and good will of the
customer and does not advertise in any way the products of the seller,
does section 2(d) apply?
Yes. In this case the benefit which flowed to the chain store from
the payment at the standard card rate by the advertiser to the broad-
casting company was realized by having the chain's name, or its pri-
vate brands, advertised on "free" time by the broadcasting company.
The chain did not receive an advertising allowance or advertising
broadcast time for the product of the respondent. The only thing the
respondent received in connection with its own product was the in-
store promotion.
2. Is it a defense to a section 2(d) charge to prove that the respon-
dent had good intentions and good motives in offering an allowance
and furnishing a benefit?
Not only in the brief of the respondents but also in the amici curiae
briefs of the broadcasting companies, one of the principal arguments
was that the arrangements between the respondents and the chain
stores were so indirect that they had no legal connection, and that in
any event the advertisers had no intention or motive to violate the
law. The court made it clear that motives were immaterial.
3. When a payment inures to the benefit of a customer on a dis-
proportionate basis, is the supplier's lack of knowledge concerning
details as to the scheme material?
The court in the Lorillard and General Foods cases stated that
section 2(d) "is only concerned with the consequences which flow
from an act. If those consequences eventuate, the act from which they
result is forbidden." In other words, the respondents' knowledge of
the details of the scheme was not material, and it was not necessary
for the Commission to find that the respondents knew, or should have
known, when they entered into the plan with the broadcasting com-
panies that the respondents in adopting such plan would be supplying
the consideration which would constitute compensation for the bene-
fits to be received by a few favored customers to the prejudice of their
competitors. The court pointed out, however, that the Commission
did make such a finding.
15. P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923
(1959).
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Moving now to section 2(e), 16 we shall consider the Simplicity
Pattern'; case in which the complaint was drawn in two counts. One
contained a section 5 Federal Trade Commission Act charge, and the
other a section 2(e) Clayton Act charge. In support of the section 5
charge, it was alleged that respondent gave its large customers a
variety of advantages not given to their smaller customers. Among
these were more favorable credit, return privileges on unsold mer-
chandise and prepayment of transportation charges. It was alleged
that the granting of special benefits to the large customers furthered
the control respondent had over their business and prevented com-
petitors from obtaining that business without unfairly discriminating
among their own large and small customers. In the second count,
charging violation of section 2 (e) of the Clayton Act, it was alleged
that respondent charged smaller customers for catalogues, pattern
cabinets and other equipment which were furnished to its large cus-
tomers without charge.
The hearing examiner dismissed the complaint as to count one for
failure of proof of competitive injury, and on appeal this was sus-
tained by the Commission. In dismissing the charge, however, the
Commission made it clear that it was not placing its stamp of ap-
proval on the practices, but was basing its decision solely on the
ground that the record before it did not sustain the allegation.
With regard to count two, the hearing examiner found that the
charges in the complaint had been sustained. In his opinion he
pointed out that while count one failed for lack of proof of injury, this
was not a defect under count two since section 2 (e) appeared to be a
per se statute, requiring no proof of injury. Upon appeal from this
phase of the examiner's decision, respondent's principal contentions
were, first, that the cost justification defense of section 2(a) should
also be applicable to section 2(e) and, second, that there was an
absence of competition between the large stores that handled patterns
for profit and the small stores which carried them as an accommo-
dation to promote the sales of fabrics and accessories.
The Commission rejected both of respondent's contentions although
it conceded there was some merit in the second. In rejecting the cost
16. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(e) states:
That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one
purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity
bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish
or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or
facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for
sale of such connodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all pur-
chasers on proportionally equal terms.
17. Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted,
360 U.S. 55 (1959).
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justification contention, it cited with approval the holding of the
court of appeals in Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion'8 that Congress had determined that practices falling within the
standard of section 2(e) were unlawful, and consequently there was
no reason for reading into it the limitations of section 2(a) or any
other similar limitations. 19
Since the Commission sustained the hearing examiner's dismissal
of count one, the court had before it for review only the matter of
section 2 (e) and the extent to which section 2 (b) might be applicable
to it for defense purposes. A divided court held that respondent was
entitled within the meaning of section 2 (b), to show its cost justi-
fication.20 On certiorari the Supreme Court held unanimously2" that
when discriminations in services or facilities occur between two
classes of competing customers, neither the absence of competitive
injury nor the presence of cost justification defeats the enforcement
of section 2 (e). The Court rejected the contention that because the
variety stores sold for profit and the fabric stores for accommoda-
tion, they were not in fact in competition with each other. It con-
cluded that the presence or absence of competition may not be predi-
cated upon such motives. Let us examine a few questions that may
be raised by this decision.
1. What defense is available under section 2(e) when the showing
has been made of a failure to proportionalize services or facilities
furnished to competing purchasers?
Where a respondent is unable to show that the services or facilities
were in fact accorded to all competing purchasers on proportionally
equal terms, the proviso of section 2 (b) permits rebutting the case
by showing that they were furnished in good faith to meet the services
or facilities furnished by a competitor.
2. Isn't it a rather %arrow construction to say that the proviso of
section 2(b) furnishes a defense for section 2(e), but that the main
body of that section does not provide any other substantive defense
of "justification"?
No. This, it seems, was basic to the error of the court of appeals
which failed to recognize that the first part of section 2(b) was
strictly procedural and, as the Supreme Court stated, "was clearly
not intended to have any independent substantive weight of its
18. 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946).
19. Id. at 135.
20. Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted,
360 U.S. 55 (1959).
21. 360 U.S. at 62-71.
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own.' -" The section, as originally reported to the Congress, dealt only
with price discriminations. Services and facilities were added on the
floor during debate, and it was explained that the purpose was to
allow the meeting not only of price competition of other competitors,
but also their competition in services and facilities furnished.
Thus, the only "justification" for discriminatory furnishing of ser-
vices or facilities is the good faith meeting of competition. As stated
by the Supreme Court:
* * * The key word 'justification' can be read no more broadly
than to allow rebuttal of the respective offenses in one of the
ways expressly made available by Congress. 23
And although a section 2 (a) offense of price discrimination may
be "justified" in various ways, Congress expressly limited the section
2(e) "justification" to meeting competitive offers of services or
facilities.
3. Isn't it inconsistent to require proof of adverse competitive
eif ects in connection with discriminations in, price under section 2(a)
but to haoe no similar requirement regarding discriminations in the
firnishing of services or facilities?
No. As the Court points out in Simplicity, Congress provided sev-
eral grounds which might be utilized in rebutting a prima facie case
under section 2 (a) which it did not make available under section 2 (e).
The Court disclaimed any intention to review the economic wisdom
of Congress, but commented that there was a rational basis for the
difference with regard to both competitive injury and cost justifica-
tion." It expressed the view that Congress may have intended to con-
fine discriminatory practices to the granting of price differentials,
where they could be more readily detected and where comparisons
with alleged cost savings could be made more easily. The congres-
sional debates lend some support to this reasoning since several refer-
ences were made to the secret character of the discriminations in-
tended in the main to be reached by subsections (c), (d) and (e) of
section 2.
Summary and brevity with respect to recent developments in com-
plex areas of the Robinson-Patman Act are at best risky, but cau-
tiously applied, can be helpful in emphasizing the points which appear
to be of particular significance. These cases, and those which were
already on the books, mark a course which can be followed without
serious difficulty if practices are avoided which push toward the
ultimate limits of lawful conduct. Practices which involve price dif-
22. Id. at 71.
23. Id. at 66.
24. Id. at 67.
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ferences designed to disrupt competitive conditions in selected areas
and which result in varying treatment of competitive customers repre-
sent, I believe, calculated risks of violation.
The Robinson-Patman Act is intended to prevent price discrimina-
tions and related practices which are unfair to competitors and which
adversely affect the ability of customers to compete in the market
place. The standard of conduct which it requires is fairness to com-
petitors and equality of treatment among customers, subject to the
right to deal in good faith with competitive circumstances which may
be encountered, and to promote competition by reflecting certain ad-
vantages which may accrue through efficiency of operations. Adher-
ence to such a standard, I believe, will go far toward preserving the
vigor of competition.
Washington University Open Scholarship
